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1. Introduction
This paper explores the notion of lock-in and lock-out via economic policy. The paper
argues that policy decisions may irrevocably or near-irrevocably change the structure of
the economy, thereby changing the economy’s characteristics and performance. Changes
to the economy’s structure then generate changed economic outcomes concerning
distribution of wealth, income and power, and those economic outcome changes in turn
induce changes in political outcomes. The latter effect has been emphasized by Palley
(2013, Chap. 12) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), both of whose analysis is highly
complementary to the proposed framework of policy lock-in.
Furthermore, the paper argues that policy decisions can also irrevocably or near-
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irrevocably change the policy possibility set. Such changes constitute economic policy
lock-in. Just as important, lock-in also tacitly implies lock-out, since policies that were
part of the possibility set become excluded. Furthermore, policy can be intentionally
designed to lock-in and lock-out possibilities. These considerations have enormous
implications for democracy since policy today can permanently change the space of
future democratic policy making.
2. Hysteresis and policy lock-in
The notion of lock-in has been extensively applied with regard to technology and the
economic history of technological change (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989). Classic examples
of lock-in are the QWERTY keyboard and narrow gauge railways, both of which are suboptimal from an engineering efficiency sense, yet may persist because of lock-in. The
reason is that once in use, sub-optimal technologies can acquire a competitive advantage
that blocks the introduction of other superior technologies.
Once the pool of users is trained with the QWERTY keyboard, workplaces will be
equipped with such keyboards and employers will look for workers with QWERTY
skills, which gives an incentive for new workers to acquire those skills. As regards
narrow gauge railway, once initially constructed, that creates a lock-in incentive for
additions to be narrow gauge to fit with the existing track. A related logic applies to new
technologies like Facebook, whose network linking users provides the value and lock-in
protection. Once in place, new users have an incentive to join the network with the largest
number of subscribers, which is Facebook.
These lock-in incentives can be overcome if a significantly more efficient
technology becomes available, thereby either giving existing participants an incentive to
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replace the existing system or giving new participants an incentive to join a new system.
However, that is a very high barrier to change.
Lock-in can be viewed as a sub-set of the broader hysteresis phenomenon.
Hysterisis is a concept drawn from physical chemistry, and concerns how systems can
change their behavioral characteristics by passing through trigger thresholds that act as
“switch-on” – “switch-off” mechanisms. Passing through the switch-on threshold acts as
a switch that changes the systems behavior. The new behavioral pattern remains in place
until the system passes through the switch-off threshold, at which time the system reverts
to its old behavior.
In economics, hysteresis has been applied to explain employment and
unemployment patterns in labor markets (Blanchard and Summers, 1987; Cross, 1993,
1995), and it has also been applied to explain why aggregate demand shocks can persist
and generate stagnation (Bassi and Lang, 2015).1 The current paper aims to apply it to
the theory of economic policy.
Irrevocable lock-in can be viewed as a form of one-sided (switch-on only)
hysteresis, with irrevocable change taking place when the system passes through the
switch-on threshold. If there exists a switch-off threshold that reverses the change, then
the lock-in process is standard two-sided hysteresis.
In physical chemistry the hysteresis thresholds can be precisely defined and
measured, and are permanent. Applied to economic policy, hysteresis should be thought
of as an illustrative metaphor that helps understand the dynamics and full impacts of

Blanchard and Summers (1987) is a unit root model, which is not technically hysteresis (Amable et al.,
1994). However, unit root models deliver economic patterns with some similarities regarding path
dependence and irreversability.

1
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policy change.
The logic of policy hysteresis is as follows. Political conditions can be described
by a continuous variable S that measures the state of political sentiment. The S variable is
systematically impacted by social and economic forces. When it passes through a
threshold S+ that triggers a change of policy regime. The threshold S+ represents the
switch-on threshold. If the policy regime is reversible there is a switch-off threshold Swhere S- < S+. If there is no switch-off threshold, the system produces permanent
irrevocable lock-in and the old policy regime can never be recovered. If there is a switchoff threshold, the system corresponds to standard hysteresis and the economy can shift
between policy regimes according to the evolution of the state of political sentiment.
These two possibilities are illustrated in Figures 1.a and 1.b. Figure 1.a shows the
standard hysteresis case where there are two switches. Figure 1.b shows the irrevocable
lock-in case where there is only a switch-on threshold.

Figures 1.a and 1.b showing the standard hysteresis and permanent lock-in mechanisms.
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Figure 1.a. Standard hysteresis.
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Figure 1.b. Permanent lock-in hysteresis.
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Though highly stylized, the policy lock-in by hysteresis model raises important
issues that are not present in the treatment of policy within conventional economic
models. Those models represent government as having a series of exogenous policy
instruments that can be adjusted by policymakers. If a policy change is reversed, the
economy simply slides back to its initial position.
The conventional treatment of economic policy makes three implicit assumptions.
First, policy change does not permanently change the economy’s structure. Second,
policy change does not permanently change political conditions that inform policy
selection. Third, policy change does not permanently change the policy possibility set.
Given these assumptions, there are no restraints, obstacles, or costs to reversing policy,
and future policy possibilities are completely unaffected by prior policy decisions.
The benefit of the lock-in by hysteresis policy model is it brings these three
assumptions into plain sight. First, there is need to identify how policy affects the
economy and economic outcomes. Second, there is need to identify how changed
economic outcomes affect the policy process and policy selection. Third, there is need to
recognize that prior policy change may restrict the future policy possibility set. These
considerations prompt new ways of thinking about policy and new political concerns.
3. Unpacking the black box of policy lock-in.
The hysteresis model illustrates the basic problem of lock-in, but there is need to unpack
the black box explaining how change of political sentiment leads to lock-in of a new
policy regime. Figure 2 unpacks this box. It shows a sequence loop running from ideas to
economic outcomes and back again.
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Figure 2. The unpacked black box of policy lock-in.
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Ideas enter and inform the policy process, which is the filter through which ideas
must pass if they are to become policy. Economic policy then impacts the economy, and
the economy generates economic outcomes. Those outcomes then loop back to impact
each stage of the process running from ideas to the economy. The linkage from policy to
the economy is particularly important since policy can change the structure of the
economy, and once the structure is changed it may be very difficult to reverse the new
policy. This type of policy lock-in is absent in conventional discussions of policy, which
tend to treat policy as if it is a “dial” that can be smoothly dialed up and down. That
may be the case, but often it is not.
The feedback loop from economic outcomes can be explained as follows.
Economic outcomes feedback and impact the structure of the economy. The major
conventional feedback is via flow – stock relations. Thus, the flow of investment adds to
the capital stock, changing the economy and subsequent economic outcomes. The same
holds for borrowing which adds to the stock of debt, and also for new financial issues that
add to the stock of outstanding financial liabilities.
6

The link between the economic policy, the economy, and economic outcomes is a
critical locus that may be characterized by hysteresis. This has been the traditional focus
of hysteresis analysis in economics, with exogenous changes causing changes in
economic structure and behavior that are hard to reverse (Cross, 1993, 1995; Bassi and
Lang 2015).
The upper loop in Figure 2 shows that economic outcomes also feedback and
impact economic policy via multiple channels. One standard feedback is via automatic
stabilizer arrangements, whereby policy settings respond automatically to economic
outcomes. A second standard feedback is via discretionary policy adjustments.
Economic outcomes may also feedback to affect the policy process. Here, one
enters the realm of political process. For instance, wealth (money) and power matter in
politics, giving influence over the policy process and policy selection. If economic
outcomes impact the distribution of wealth and power, economic outcomes will influence
the policy process and policy selection. Such feedback effects from policy to policy have
been discussed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) in the framework of political
equilibrium. They are implicitly talking about a feedback loop such as is described in
Figure 2. Economic policy affects outcomes that in turn change the political equilibrium
– which I prefer to call “policy equilibrium”.
The launch point for Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2013) analysis is second-best
theory (Lancaster and Lipsey, 1956). They are concerned that market failures have
unappreciated policy equilibrium consequences because market failures generate rents
that impact the political process. According to economists, remedying those market
failures is good economic policy. However, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that may not
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be the case if remedying the market failure causes adverse changes in the political
equilibrium (i.e. the policy equilibrium).
The launch point for the current analysis is lock-in. First, policy change causes
changes in the economy’s structure, which may be one source of lock-in. Second,
changes in the economy’s structure cause changed economic outcomes that may generate
secondary (indirect) sources of lock-in. Wealth and income distribution represent
endowments, and endowments are the material of lock-in since they give agents the
power to lock-in new policy equilibria. Consequently, a policy change can lock-in both
structural economic change and changed policy equilibrium.
Lastly, as shown in Figure 2, economic outcomes may influence economic ideas
and beliefs, which are part of the raw input into the policy process and policy design. The
standard view is that economic outcomes provide the data for scientific revision of
economic hypotheses and theories. However, economic outcomes also influence the
production and dissemination of ideas via the influence of wealth and power. That makes
the effect of the economy on ideas complicated, and not neutral and objective as claimed
by the standard view.
Rodrik (2014) has recently sought to introduce ideas into a political model of
policy equilibrium. However, his concept of ideas only partially captures what is intended
here. For Rodrik (2014), ideas are akin to policy innovations and he explicitly parallels
policy innovation with innovative activity in technology. Thus, ideas (i.e. policy
innovations) are either a way of shifting the production possibility frontier (PPF), or they
can provide a new mutually beneficial resolution to political conflict so as to move the
policy equilibrium closer to society’s PPF. That construction is a “better mousetrap”
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approach to ideas.
Rodrik’s (2014) framing of ideas is technological and benevolent, and it contrasts
with current framing in which ideas provide the political justification and rationalization
for policies. Political economy is a “war of ideas” (Palley, 2012, Chap. 1; 2013, Chap.
12), and economic theory and economists are enlisted in that war. Big theory (e.g.
Keynesian versus new classical macroeconomics) shapes specific policy ideas and
influences whether specific policy ideas can get a political hearing.2 Theoretical
hegemony matters, and which theory is hegemonic is influenced by economic outcomes
and the distribution of income, wealth, and power. That is the basis of Karl Marx’s (1845,
p.61) abiding and penetrating observation that: “The ideas of the ruling class are in every
epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the
same time its ruling intellectual force.”
The notion of hegemony of ideas is suggestive of another source of hysteresis
concerning domination and exclusion of ideas. If economic ideas take a turn in one
direction, it may be difficult to reverse them subsequently. Siegle at al. (2004) argue that
democracies out-perform autocratic political systems because they are adaptable and have
feedback mechanisms that prevent economic policy-induced low growth traps. However,
that feature of democracy may fail if economics becomes captured by a single school of
thought (Palley, 2012, Chap. 11). The possibility of such capture is facilitated by the fact
that the academy is structured as a club, and existing club members may refuse to elect

Palley (1993, p.13 - 17; 1996, Chap. 6, 96 - 101) discusses the importance of ideas for macroeconomic
modelling, particularly rational expectations. Agents within the macro model have their own views that
shape their behaviors and expectations. These agents are then placed within the economist’s model of the
world, which the economist assumes to be the “true” model. The hegemony of neoliberalism means
establishment economists all assume neoclassical economics provides the “true” model of the world, and
the club of elite academic economists exclude all who disagree.

2
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those who hold different theoretical points of view. That can lead to the extinction of
economic policy ideas, which is a form of intellectual lock-in (Palley, 1997).
In sum, there are two critical features of the policy process loop described in
Figure 2. First, it is very different from the standard representation in which policy is a
dial that is simply dialed up or down in response to economic conditions, with no
permanent impact on either the economy, the political system, or the policy possibility
set. In contrast, the representation of policy in Figure 2 shows it to be a multiple stage
feedback loop in which policy is not exogenous with respect to the economy. Instead,
policy should be viewed as an embedded part of the economy, and understanding the
economy requires understanding the way in which the policy process is embedded.
Second, multiple elements of the policy loop are subject to hysteresis which produces
policy lock-in and lock-out. In terms of the policy dial metaphor, once policy is “dialed
up”, it may not be possible to dial it back down. Identifying how policy lock-in and lockout works requires a complete representation of the policy process since lock-in and lockout can take place in different stages of the process.
4. Examples of policy lock-in and lock-out
(a) The euro. The introduction of the euro in 1999 represents a classic example of policy
lock-in.3 Adoption of the euro changed the structure of member countries’ economies.
Countries gave up their monetary sovereignty by giving up their separate currencies,
exchange rates, and power to issue money. That power was surrendered to the European
Central bank (ECB). Analytically, this surrender of monetary sovereignty reduced the
financial status of countries to that of provinces since, like provinces, countries no longer
Another classic example of lock-in was Argentina’s currency board which was eventually abandoned in
2002 under extreme economic and political duress.

3
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have a central bank to back their debt or finance their budget deficits.
At the individual country level, the euro has parallels with the gold standard, with
the euro serving the role of analog gold (Palley, 2010). The big difference from the
classical gold standard is that the ECB has the power to issue euros and relax the analog
gold constraint, but it is significantly constrained in the way it does so and cannot do so
on a country-by-country basis.
The euro has created policy lock-in because countries that enter may find it
impossible to exit. Once a country enters, its liabilities, which were previously
denominated in its own currency or the currency of other member countries, are
converted into euros. This creates asymmetric lock-in. Economically weak countries (e.g.
Greece) cannot exit because they are saddled with euro denominated debt. If they create a
new currency and exit, they will immediately confront an exchange rate collapse that
increases the burden of their euro debts, creating a debt crisis. In contrast, strong
economies (e.g. Germany) that create a new currency and exit will find their new
exchange rate appreciates, diminishing the burden of any euro denominated debts.
Consequently, they can exit.
The adoption of the euro has therefore created asymmetric lock-in, with weak
countries locked-in to the system. Moreover, it has created expansionary fiscal policy
lock-out for weak countries as they can no longer finance budgets by printing money, and
nor can they use bond financed budget deficits if they are frozen out of the bond market.4

The justification for the euro was provided by new classical macroeconomics (NCM) which was the
dominant macroeconomic theory in the 1980s and early 1990s. NCM views money as neutral and saw the
euro’s analog gold standard as unproblematic. There was no need to consider the monetary – fiscal
connection, and severing that connection was beneficial as it imposed monetary (central bank) dominance.
The only problem concerned the surrender of individual exchange rates. NCM’s justification for the euro’s
architecture illustrates how ideas matter for policy, as shown in Figure 2.

4
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(b) Deindustrialization and unions. Another example of policy induced lock-in stems
from international economic policies like exchange rate over-valuation and trade policy.
Not only do these policies impact the level of aggregate demand and economic activity,
they also change the economy’s structure by causing deindustrialization which, in turn,
causes de-unionization as unions have been concentrated in manufacturing for historical
reasons.
Hysterisis arises for two reasons. First, manufacturing may not come back if the
policies are reversed. That is because companies may undertake fixed cost investment in
foreign countries during the period of over-valuation. When the undervaluation reverses,
they are unwilling to close those investments and repatriate production. The threshold for
moving production (switch-on) is different from the threshold for repatriating production
(switch-off). The logic of this threshold asymmetry is similar to that identified by Dixit
(1989, 1992) in connection with the dynamics of import penetration.
Second, unions may not come back even if manufacturing comes back. That is
because unions are organizations that were formed in a different social and political time
(the Great Depression) when worker social solidarity and political and economic
consciousness was different. Having destroyed union institutional organization (switchon), current socio-political conditions do not support its reconstitution even if
deindustrialization is reversed (switch-off). This is an example of hysterisis via history.
The destruction of unions also has other effects via the upper branch of the
feedback loop in Figure 2. First, it changes income distribution in favor of capital.
Second, unions are important political actors who influence the policy process, and
diminished union size means diminished union political influence. These two changes –
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increased capital income share and reduced union size – may then feedback to impact the
policy equilibrium via reduced union input (increased business input) in the policy
process, and via diminished union impact on the ideas shaping policy thinking. These
constitute “indirect” hysteresis effects stemming from the “direct” hysteresis effect on
economic structure initially caused by policy. These indirect slower developing effects
can have permanent historical impacts by changing society’s economic trajectory.
(c) Mergers and deregulation. A third source of hysteresis concerns the creation of
increased market power as a result of mergers and deregulation that change business
concentration. These developments change the structure of the economy, which changes
economic outcomes that feedback into the policy process and longer-term idea formation.
A classic example is the increase in financial sector concentration that preceded
the financial crisis of 2008, and was then accelerated by the crisis as policymakers used
bank mergers to contain the crisis. Mergers (switch-on) are costly to undo (switch-off) so
that increased concentration embeds lock-in. Once in place, concentration tends to stay in
place.
Increased financial concentration may have increased the financial sector’s share
of income. More importantly, it has increased the financial sector’s influence over the
policy process and the generation of ideas shaping understandings of the economy. These
latter influences are core elements of the phenomenon of financialization (Palley, 2007a,
2013), which should be understood as a hysteretic process that locks-in transformational
change.
(d) Tax policy. Taxation is another policy area subject to lock-in. Macroeconomic
textbooks treat taxation as an instrument that can be dialed up or down in the service of
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aggregate demand management. However, taxation affects the distribution of income and
wealth, which can permanently affect political influence and the policy equilibrium. In
terms of a sequential period model, wealth and income distribution constitute initial
conditions. By changing wealth and income distribution, current tax policy impacts future
initial conditions, which permanently changes the future policy equilibrium.
Tax rates are also subject to political “ratchet” effects. Tax cuts are politically
popular, while tax increases are politically unpopular. That asymmetry means it is easy to
put tax cuts in place (switch-on), but much harder to reverse them (switch-off).
Consequently, tax policy is subject to hysteresis that affects economic outcomes (income
and wealth distribution), which in turn have additional permanent impacts on the policy
equilibrium.
(e) Privatization and government policy capacity. Privatization can be another source of
hysteresis. Privatization and contracting-out (switch-on) can result in the destruction of
government’s capacity to undertake policy because it may destroy government’s
organization capital (i.e. government’s capacity to produce services). Once destroyed, it
may not be worth government investing to re-build that organization capital (switch-off).
The dynamics of policy capacity destruction are similar to those of
deindustrialization and import penetration hysteresis (Dixit, 1989, 1992). Once
privatization has destroyed government’s organization capital, a subsequent new
government, that is in principle favorable to public production and provision of services,
may still stick with privatized arrangements because the costs of rebuilding lost
organization capital are too high. That creates a margin where private contractors can
under-deliver relative to their initial promises (in terms of productive efficiency and
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price), yet it is still not worth reinvesting in public production capability. Only when the
inefficiency or price gouging gets beyond a threshold does reinvestment in public
production capacity become worthwhile.
Furthermore, the destruction of policy capacity may not only lock-in inefficient
private production of public goods, it may also shrink the policy possibility set by taking
policy options off the table. That can have additional lasting impacts via changed public
choices.5
(f) Globalization. Globalization is another important source of policy lock-in (Palley,
2007b). Globalization creates new institutions and new patterns of economic activity.
Trade agreements create new rules, which foster new patterns of global production that
set the basis for negotiation of future trade and investment agreements. For instance,
NAFTA established the template for the WTO. The lock-in aspect comes from the facts
that trade agreements and treaties cannot easily be reversed because of both political and
economic costs. Country go-it-alone reversal is difficult, and there are massive costs
associated with global reorganization of production that discourage reversal. Trade
agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, also constrain the policies that countries can
pursue. That reduces national policy space.
Politically, the problem is that today’s globalization was designed with little
attention to labor and social issues. That is because the system was largely stitched
together in the last quarter of the 20th century, a period of labor political weakness and
The destruction of government capacity has some similarities with the effects of increased government
debt. A high debt-to-GDP ratio reduces fiscal space and opportunities for public investment. Austerity is an
ineffective way of reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio and, historically, growth has been the only successful
remedy. However, if growth is not forthcoming, a country can find itself trapped without fiscal space owing
to large past budget deficits that increased the debt-to-GDP ratio. In this fashion, large debt-financed
budget deficits can be used as a pre-commitment mechanism to pre-empt the policy space of future
governments.

5

15

laissez-faire revival. Consequently, arrangements were forged without attention to labor,
social or environmental concerns. Despite these failings, like a narrow gauge railway
system, the system keeps getting extended out, driven by the combination of corporate
interests and the costs of shifting to an alternative globalization.
This configuration is illustrated in Figure 3. The right-hand panel shows that
policy space decreases as the globalization increases. The relationship is represented as
non-linear. Initially, globalization may produce only small losses of policy space: then the
losses may steepen; and once the system is highly globalized, the policy space losses
from further marginal increases in globalization may slow again. The current level of
globalization is G0, and lock-in means that policymakers can further deepen the level of
globalization (i.e. increase G) but not reverse it (i.e. decrease G).
The left-hand panel shows the range of the policy target variable (e.g. income
equality) that national policymakers can achieve. As globalization increases and national
policy space declines, the achievable range shrinks. For a given level of globalization, G0,
the achievable range of the policy variable (X) that the policymaker can hit is [X0,+ , X-].
The upper limit is X0,+ and the lower limit is X-. In Figure 3, the range shrinks as
globalization deepens owing to a decline in the upper limit (i.e. the best outcome) that the
policymaker can achieve.
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Figure 3. Globalization and the lock-in of reduced national policy space.
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5. Globalization: trilemma or dilemma?
Rodrik (2011) has argued that globalization poses a trilemma between globalization,
national sovereignty, and democratic politics. He argues that you can have any two, but
not all three. The framework in Figure 3 qualifies that interpretation. From the
perspective of the nation state there is no trilemma, only a dilemma.
National sovereignty can be identified with national policy space. Globalization
creates a trade-off between national policy space and the degree of globalization, with
national policy space declining as globalization deepens. Democracy is not at issue.
Countries can be outside of globalization and democratic, or they can be engaged in
globalization and democratic. Democratic politics is always viable. The problem is
globalization diminishes the “content” of democratic politics, as measured by the
achievable range of the policy target.
It is these type of concerns that motivate criticism of trade agreements like the
17

Trans-Pacific Partnership. Whereas trade agreements fifty years ago were about reducing
tariffs and quotas, today they are “global governance agreements (Palley, 2016)” that are
writing the rules of a new world order. These global governance agreements
fundamentally impact national policy space. A clear example of this is the new system
governing disputes between governments and foreign-based corporate investors, which
involves an extra-legal investor – state dispute settlement (ISDS) process that is outside
of nations’ own legal systems. As Renato Ruggerio (1996), the first General Secretary of
the World Trade Organization observed at its onset: “We are no longer writing the rules of
interaction among separate national economies. We are writing the constitution of a
single global economy.”
In fact, the problem is likely more complex than illustrated in Figure 3 because a
country that seeks to avoid globalization may still find its policy space impacted by
globalization. This is illustrated in Figure 4. As globalization increases in the rest of the
world (G*0 < G*1), policy space decreases in country i despite unchanged local
engagement with globalization (Pi,0(Gi,0, G*0) > Pi,0(Gi,0, G*1)), which reduces the
achievable range of the policy target (Xi,0+( Gi,0, G*0) > Xi,0+( Gi,0, G*1)). That is because
globalization is relational. When other countries deepen their globalization, that imposes
additional constraints on countries that do not follow suit because it negatively impacts
the latter’s network of relations. The exact nature of this shift will depend on the type of
globalization adopted by the rest of the world.
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Figure 3. The effect of increased globalization in the rest of the world (G*0 < G*1) on national policy
space in country i.
National policy
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6. Conclusions: rethinking economists’ approach to policy and political economy.
This paper has proposed a theory of economic policy lock-in and lock-out via hysteresis.
Hysterisis is a concept that has been occasionally applied to describe path dependence in
the real economy, especially as regards unemployment (Blanchard and Summers, 1987;
Cross, 1993, 1995). It turns out hysteresis has general and frequent relevance to
understanding the impact of economic policy which locks-in features within the economy
and also locks-out other possibilities.
Viewing economic policy through the lens of lock-in also connects with the
political equilibrium approach to policy described by Acemoglu and Robinson (2013),
and that approach can be interpreted as a form of lock-in analysis. Economic policy
changes the structure, which in turn generates new economic outcomes. Those outcomes
change endowments (e.g. the distribution of wealth, income, and power), which can then
permanently change the political/policy equilibrium.
19

That frame is dramatically different from the policy “dial” approach of textbooks
which identify neither lock-in effects nor feedback effects on the policy equilibrium. The
existing textbook approach treats policy as if it were exogenous to the economy. A lockin policy equilibrium approach seeks to make policy an integral part of the economy, a
segment to be understood and modelled just as the goods market, labor market, and
financial sector are. Economic outcomes are then the product of the joint interaction of all
four sectors – the political sector, the goods market, the labor market, and the financial
sector.
The proposed lock-in approach to policy may have further applications in
development economics and be fruitful for understanding countries’ development paths.
It also has important applications for political economy. For instance, neoliberalism is
usually assessed in terms of its impact on inequality and growth (Palley, 2012). This
paper suggests it should also be interpreted as a system of domestic and international
policy lock-in. At the domestic level this is accomplished via such measures as
privatization, deregulation, the destruction of government policy capacity, taxation, and
deindustrialization and de-unionization. At the international level this is accomplished via
global trade and governance agreements, abolition of financial capital controls,
international financial integration, and currency unions.
For those opposed to neoliberalism there is a double challenge. First, how does
one go about escaping the policy lock-in created by neoliberalism. Second, how does one
design competing social democratic policies that deliver similar lock-in effects, thereby
nailing down the future political economy trajectory. A clear counter-example to
neoliberalism is President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. The New Deal can be
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understood as instance of successful social democratic lock-in, and its success is evident
in its persistent durability despite decades of political challenge and technological
innovation. Neoliberalism can be viewed as intentionally aiming to undermine the New
Deal and lock-in an antithetical policy regime.
The lock-in approach to policy is a different way of thinking about policy design
compared to the conventional Keynesian approach based on macroeconomic stabilization
theory. The latter seeks to dial policy stimulus up or down, depending on the state of the
economy. In the conventional view, the challenge is to get the timing right, and often that
may be done best via some form of automaticity (i.e. automatic stabilizer). A policy lockin perspective adds thinking about designing policies that are difficult to reverse in the
event of future unfavorable political change.
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